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The courts of the minority, and most recently the court in Beaudette,
have recognized the necessity to break from tradition. They have effectively rebutted the criteria developed by the majority courts. This step
is clearly a positive one, for the law can only function when it affords a
means to hear the complaints of all of its subjects. Thus, the fiction
of marital unity should no longer be used to prevent the furtherance of a
goal of society: the promotion of harmony through justice.
Daniel E. Wanat
INSURANCE-EXCESS EXPOSURE-INSURER'S
DUTY TO ADVISE INSURED OF HIS
RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTE
John F. Kiely was fatally injured when struck by a truck owned by
Nathan and Manuel Brockstein and driven by Irving Bloom, an employee
of the Brocksteins. Kiely's estate sued the Brocksteins and Bloom on two
causes of action, one for wrongful death, asking $50,000 for the widow,
and the other claiming $500,000 for decedent's pain and suffering. The
Brocksteins were insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company for
bodily injury liability arising out of the use of the truck. The maximum
coverage for any one person was $50,000. Settlement negotiations collapsed, and a judgment was finally entered for $106,413.33.1 Nationwide paid $50,000, plus costs and interest of $8,847.81. The balance of
the judgment was settled by the payment of $25,000 by the Brocksteins.
The Brocksteins then brought an action against Nationwide on the
theory that the insurer did not properly represent the interests of the insured in its efforts to settle the case. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York entered judgment for Nationwide.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that the insurer was guilty of bad faith because the insurer did
not advise the insured during the settlement negotiations that he could
contribute toward a settlement within the policy limits. Brockstein v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 417 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1969)
(hereinafter cited as Brockstein II).
The significance of this decision is that in situations where a claim
potentially exceeds policy limits, and a settlement demand is made within
1. Brochstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. N.Y. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Brockstein I]. Note that the spelling of this case title differs
from the spelling of the title in the appellate court, Brockstein v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Brockstein I]; the
"Brockstein" spelling will be used in this note.
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such limits, an insurer, if he is not willing to meet the demand, is required
to advise the insured that he may contribute toward a settlement of the
claim if he is so disposed. Implicit in this requirement is a further duty
of informing the insured of the possibilities of the risk he runs if he
chooses not to contribute. The purpose of this note is to analyze and
critically evaluate this extension in the law of excess exposure.
The theory that liability insurers may be liable for amounts exceeding
the limits of their indemnity insurance policies where a settlement offer
within policy limits was rejected, has developed dramatically over the past
several years. At first, the courts adopted the rule that the insurer had no
duty to consider the interests of the insured in determining whether or not
to settle a claim. One of the earlier cases to discuss the issue held that:
The rights of the parties are to be determined by the agreement into which they
entered. By the provisions of the policy the insurance company was obliged to
defend at its own cost any action against the insured, and the entire management
of the defense was expressly intrusted to it, and the insured was forbidden to settle
any claim, or to interfere in any negotiations for settlement. . . . The insurer
was under no obligation to pay in advance of trial, and the decision whether to
settle or to try2 was committed to it. The plain words of the policy have no
other meaning.

Gradually, over the years, the interests of the insured during the settlement
stages were granted protection and the rule evolved that the insurer
has a duty to consider settlement possibilities. The rationale of that rule
is as follows:
[I]n every contract, including policies of insurance, there is an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything that will injure
the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement; that it is common
knowledge that one of the usual methods by which an insured receives protection
under a liability policy is by settlement of claims without litigation; that the implied
obligation of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate case although the express terms of the policy do not impose the duty; that in
determining whether to settle the insurer must give the interest of the insured at
least as much consideration as it gives to its own interests; and that "when there
is a great risk of recovery beyond the policy limits so that the most reasonable
manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement which can be made within those
in good faith of the insured's interest requires the insurer
limits, a consideration
'
to settle the claim."

The insurance contract issued to the Brocksteins obligated Nationwide:
(i) to pay all sums (up to the policy limit) which plaintiff assureds were legally
obligated to pay as damages for bodily injury and death, and (ii) to defend any
suit for such damages "even if the suit is groundless . . . but the Company may
2. C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 288-89,
90 A. 653, 654 (1914).
3. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 176 (1967).
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make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems
expedient." The contract required that the insured shall cooperate with the company "and shall assist in effecting settlements . . . and in the conduct of suits."
The contract continues: "The Insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense" except for
emergency medical aid.4

This is a typical defense and settlement provision,5 wherein the insurance carrier takes complete control of both the defense of any action
against the insured and any settlement decisions within policy limits.
The purpose of this provision is to permit the insurance carrier to retain
its own legal counsel on behalf of the insured and thus assure itself that
the defense will be in experienced and competent hands. This, hopefully,
will reduce the ultimate liability of the insurer.6 Thus, the insured gives
up his right to defend an action against him to the extent of the policy
7
limits; the duty to defend is then imposed upon the insurer.
The policy provisions regarding settlement are permissive in form but
most courts have long held that there is some duty to settle. 8 This duty
arises out of the defense and settlement provisions of the insurance policy
and the resulting relationship of the insurer and the insured. 9 Where
4. Brockstein I, supra note 1, at 224-25.
5. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv.
L. REV. 1136, 1137 (1954).
6. Roos, The Obligation to Defend and Some Related Problems, 13 HASTINGS
LJ. 206 (1961); Note, Liability Insurance Policy Defenses and the Duty to De-

fend, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1436 (1955).
7. This duty, along with the insured's surrender of control, arises out of the
express provisions of the policy.
8. As early as 1914, in the case of Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y.
235, 242, 104 N.E. 622, 624 (1914), the New York Court of Appeals found an

insurer liable for failure to settle a claim against its insured or, in the alternative,
to pay for the prosecution of a successful appeal of a verdict entered against him
on the grounds that if "it was incumbent on the [insured] to 'deal fairly and in good
faith . .. and that he should not voluntarily or knowingly do any acts which
would impose or tend to impose on him or on [the insurer] a loss' . . . it was not

less the correlative obligation of the [insurer] to 'deal fairly and in good faith' with
him." See also Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer,
28 INs. COUNSEL J.395 (1961).
9. The courts are divided as to whether this duty arises out of the contract
directly or whether it sounds in tort. The Brassil case, supra note 8, finds the
obligation to arise from implied terms of the contract. See, e.g., Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), 204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413
(1931).
Generally, however, this duty is held to sound in tort rather than contract. See
supra note 5, at 1138 n.5. The duty to settle arises out of the relationship created
by the contract between the insurer and the insured, but the breach of that duty
is considered a tort. See, e.g., Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indem.
Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 662, 60 N.E.2d 896, 901 (1945).
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the claim against the insured is within the policy limits, the insured has
no interest in the decision of the insurer as to whether or not it will settle
the claim. 10 However, a conflict of interests arises between the insurer
and the insured where the claim against the insured exceeds the policy

limits." It is in these situations where the insurer, in settlement negotiations has the power to affect the insured's as well as its own interests,
that courts have imposed upon the insurer a duty to exercise this power
12
with care.
A sharp division of authority exists among the courts in determining
the standard against which the duty to settle will be judged. A majority of

jurisdictions presently work within the "bad faith rule."'1 3 The application

10. Olson v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 375, 379, 118 N.W.2d 318, 321
(1962).
11. Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 69 Ill. App. 2d 196, 206, 216 N.E.2d 198,
204 (1966). Were the insurer to settle the claim against the insured within the
policy limits, the insured would escape all personal risk of loss. However, if the
claim is not settled and is allowed to go to judgment, the insured stands the risk
of personal loss should the judgment exceed the applicable coverage. It is therefore in the insured's interests that a settlement within limits be reached. Unless it
is certain that a judgment would approach or exceed policy limits, it is in the insurer's interests to "take a chance" on a possible favorable verdict. See, supra note 5,
at 1142.
12. Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra note 11.
13. Arizona: General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Little, 103
Ariz. 435, 443 P.2d 690 (1968); California: Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., supra
note 3; Co!orado: United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.Lembk", 328 F.2d 569
(10th Cir. 1964) (applying Colorado law); Florida: American Fidelity Fire Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 177 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Georgia: United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E.2d 809 (1967); Indiana:
Kingan & Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Ind. App. 301, 115 N.E. 348 (1917);
Iowa: Kohlstedt v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 258 Iowa 337, 139 N.W.2d 184
(1965); Kentucky: Harvin v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 428 S.W.2d 213
(Ky. Ct. App. 1968); Louisiana: Younger v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 174 So.
2d 672 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Massachusetts: Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 184, 158 N.E.2d 338 (1959); Michigan: Jackson v. St. PaulMercury Indem. Co., 339 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1964); (applying Michigan Law); Minnesota: Peterson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Minn. 482, 160 N.W.2d 541
(1968); Mississippi: Home Indem. Co. v. Williamson, 183 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.
1950) (applying Mississippi law); Missouri: Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390
S.W.2d 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Montana: National Farmers Union Property &
Cas. Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1964); Nebraska: Olson v. Union
Fire Ins. Co., supra note 10; New Jersey: Deblon v. Beaton, 103 N.J. Super. 345,
247 A.2d 172 (1968); New Mexico: Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 388
F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1968) (applying New Mexico law); New York: Best Bldg.
Co. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928); North
Carolina: Abernethy v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 373 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1967) (applying North Carolina law); North Dakota: Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 304
F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1962) (applying North Dakota law); Ohio: Slater v. Motorists
Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962); Oklahoma: Hazelrigg v.
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and scope of the rule have greatly varied. In Johnson v. Hardware
Mutual Casualty Co., the Supreme Court of Vermont defined "bad faith"
as "the intentional disregard of the financial interests of the [insured] in
the hope of escaping the full responsibility imposed upon [the insurer]
by its policy .
circumstances."

. .

14

. Bad faith [is a] state of mind, indicated by acts and

However, in Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co. 15 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a decision whether or not to settle "must be
honest and intelligent if it be a good faith -conclusion."'" This is much
more stringent than the requirement that the insurer must not intentionally disregardthe insured's interests. The Hilker case then blends considerations which normally apply to negligence situations. The court stated:
In order that [the conclusion] be honest and intelligent it must be based upon a
knowledge of the facts and circumstances upon which liability is predicated and
upon a knowledge of the nature and extent of the injuries so far as they reasonably can be ascertained. This requires the insurance company to make a diligent effort to ascertain the facts upon which only an intelligent and good faith
17
judgment may be predicated.

A small minority of jurisdictions apply the negligence rule to deter-

mine the liability of insurers for excess verdicts.' 8 These states consider the negligence test a more rigid one than bad faith. They define

bad faith in a strict fashion, holding it to constitute fraud or deceit. 19

The negligence rule is defined as: "that degree of care and diligence which

an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the management of his own
business."' 20 Much has been written on the distinction between a negliAmerican Fidelity & Cas. Co., 241 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1957) (applying Oklahoma
law); Pennsylvania: Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8
(1966); Tennessee: State Auto Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 221 Tenn. 421, 427 S.W.2d
30 (1967); Utah: Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d
576 (1967); Vermont: Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817
(1939); Virginia: Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220
(1966); Wisconsin: Baker v. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 26 Wis. 2d 306, 132
N.W.2d 493 (1965); Wyoming: Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fowler, 390 P.2d 602
(Wyo. 1964).
14. Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., supra note 13, at 491, 494, 1 A.2d at
820, 822 (emphasis added).
15. Supra note 9.
16. Supra note 9, at 15, 235 N.W. at 414.
17. Supra note 9, at 15, 235 N.W. at 414 (emphasis added).
18. Only two states apply solely the negligence rule: Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947); G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v.
American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
19. Id.
20. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., supra note 18.
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gence standard and a bad faith standard. 21 For all practical purposes,
however, it makes little difference in the final outcome which standard
is applied; since liability is generally founded upon the same facts and
circumstances, what is considered negligence in a negligence standard
jurisdiction is simply considered bad faith by a court applying the bad
22
faith standard.
A growing minority of jurisdictions in grappling with the elusive distinction between the negligence rule and the bad faith rule have adopted a
dual standard and allow recovery upon either the negligence or bad faith
theories. 23 Those states which follow this dual standard generally require
the insurer to use ordinary care in acquiring sufficient facts upon
which to make the good faith determination of whether to settle or defend, as well as in the defense of the suit itself. However, they still apply
the "good faith" standard in evaluating the insurer's decision to settle
24
or defend.
The scope of the insurer's duty toward its insured in the settlement
stage of the defense varies from holdings that an insurer is strictly liable
for judgments in excess of policy limits where settlement could have been
21. See 7A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4712 (1962); 14
COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 51.3-51.7 (1965); Jarrett, Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 28 INS. COUNSEL J. 58 (1961); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra note 5; Levit, The Crisci CaseSomething Old, Something New, 2 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 1 (1968); Roos,
A Note on the Excess Problem, 1952 INS. L.J. 192; Comment, Insurer's Liability for
Wrongful Refusal to Defend or Settle, 36 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 304 (1968); Comment,
Duty of a Liability Insurer to Settle Within Policy Limits-The Problem of Excess
Liability, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 557 (1963); Note, 62 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1949);
Note, 15 S.C.L. REV. 850 (1963); Note, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 544 (1968).
22. Keeton, supra note 5, at 1141.
23. Alabama: Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cosby, 277 Ala. 596, 173 So.
2d 585 (1965); Arkansas: Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 233 Ark.
1011, 351 S.W.2d 158 (1961); Connecticut: Knudsen v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 26 Conn. Super. 325, 222 A.2d 811 (Conn. Ct. C. P. 1966); Delaware:
Stillwell v. Parsons, 51 Del. 342, 145 A.2d 397 (1958); Illinois: Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra note 11; Kansas: Bollinger v. Nuss, 202 Kan. 326, 449
P.2d 502 (1969); Maine: Wilson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 145 Me. 370, 76 A.2d
111 (1950); Maryland: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324,
236 A.2d 269 (1967); Oregon: Kuzmanich v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 242 Ore. 529,
410 P.2d 812 (1966); Rhode Island: McGarry v. Rhode Island Mut. Ins. Co., 90
R.I. 337, 158 A.2d 156 (1960); South Carolina: Andrews v. Central Sur. Ins. Co.,
271 F. Supp. 814 (D.S.C. 1967); West Virginia: Speicher v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 151 W. Va. 292, 151 S.E.2d 684 (1966); Washington: Murray v.
Mossman, 56 Wash. 2d 909, 355 P.2d 985 (1960).
24. Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., supra note 9;
Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 Ore. 1, 298 P.2d 1002 (1956); Hilker v.
Western Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 9. But see Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Parker, 232 Ark. 841, 341 S.W.2d 36 (1960).
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effected within those limits but was not, 25 to those finding the carrier

liable only for such excess judgment where it can be shown that the insurer was guilty of fraud or deceit. 26 Between these two extremes, where
most jurisdictions lie, 27 the definition of the duty to settle arises out of the

conflicting interests of the insured and the insurer. 28 Thus, the question
becomes one of whose interests are paramount or whose interests are to
29
be sacrificed.
Some courts have held that in determining whether or not to settle the
insurer must give the interests of the insured some consideration, but the
courts have not indicated what relative weight the two conflicting interests
should receive.3 0 Another line of cases permits the insurer to give primary
2
consideration to its own interests. 3 1 The cases following this standard
25. No decisions have, as yet, expressly held in favor of the absolute liability
doctrine, but it did receive strong support as dicta in Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.,
supra note 3, at 431, 426 P.2d at 173, where the court said: "[Tlhere is more than
a small amount of elementary justice in a rule that would require that, in this
situation where the insurer's and insured's interests necessarily conflict, the insurer,
which may reap the benefits of its determination not to settle, should also suffer
the detriments of its decision."
While such a solution to the conflict of interests problem would be much
simpler to administer than the more subjective standards discussed infra, there are
varied arguments against its adoption. The subject has created much commentary.
See, e.g., Seiver, Beyond the "Bad Faith" Rule: New Excess Liability for Insurance
Carriersand Their Attorneys, PROCEEDINGS, A.B.A. SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE, AND COMPENSATION LAW 391 (1969); Keeton, supra note 5; Levit, supra
note 21; Snow, Excess Liability-Crisciand Lysick, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 51 (1969)
Comment, Excess Liability Suits-The Mounting Need for Strict Liability, 13 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 292 (1968); Comment, California-InSearch of a Solution for Excess
Liability Problems, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 97 (1968); Comment, An Insurance Company's Duty to Settle: Qualified or Absolute?, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 120 (1967);
Comment, Crisci's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurer's Failure to Settle: A Move
Toward Rational Settlement Behavior, 43 WASH. L. REV. 799 (1968).
26. E.g., Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923);
Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., supra note 13, at 286, 187 A. at 796.
27. No jurisdictions have expressly adopted strict liability. See generally supra
note 25. Texas has come quite close to that standard with its so-called "Stowers
Doctrine," whereby the insurer is liable for damages "if the ordinarily prudent
person, in the exercise of ordinary care, as viewed from the standpoint of the assured, would have settled the case, and failed or refused to do so." G.A. Stowers
Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., supra note 18, at 547 (emphasis added).
The fraud or deceit standard has been abandoned by all jurisdictions. See notes 13,
18 and 23 supra.
28. Supra note 11.
29. Supra note 5, at 1142.
30. Garcia & Diaz, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 147 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct.
1955); Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat. Ins. Co., supra note 24; Southern Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952).
31. Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 26; Wisconsin Zinc Co. v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W. 1081 (1916).
32. Roos, supra note 21, n.2, speaks of this as the "archaic bad faith test."
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represent but a slight advance over the old, strict contract principle cases
3
such as C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Insurance Co. 3
At the other extreme are the cases which hold that the insurer must give
paramount consideration to the insured's interests to the detriment of its
own interests. 34 Application of this standard is, practically speaking, an
application of strict liability since it is only in rare cases (such as where a
settlement would injure the insured's business or professional interests)
that it is not in the best interests of the insured to have a case settled within
his policy limits and thus avoid any risk of excess liability.3 5 The standard accepted by most courts is that of "equal consideration. ' 3
Professor Keeton has stated the rule in the following form:
With respect to the decision whether to settle or try the case, the insurance company
must in good faith view the situation as it would if there were no policy limit
37
applicable to the claim.

This standard has been well accepted by the courts38 and is the standard
39
applied by the Brockstein II court.
The general rule, as stated, is relatively simple and would seem to supply a fair and equitable solution to the conflict of interests problem inherent
in the relationship of the insurer and the insured in cases where the
33. Supra note 2.
34. Hazelrigg v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., supra note 13, at 873. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 95, 156 S.E.2d 809, 811
(1967); Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 374, 228 S.W.2d 750, 756
(1950); Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 292, 170 S.E.
346, 348 (1933).
35. See supra note 27.
36. Potomac Ins. Co. v. Wilkins Co., 376 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1967); Hernandez
v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 346 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1965); Ballard v. Citizens
Cas. Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., supra note 3;
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Evans, supra note 13.
37. Supra note 5, at 1148.
38. "[T]he fairest method of balancing the interests is for the insurer to treat
the claim as if it were alone liable for the entire amount." Bell v. Commercial Ins.
Co., 280 F.2d 514, 515 (3d Cir. 1960).
"In determining whether to settle the insurer must give the interests of the insured
at least as much consideration as it gives to its own interests; . . . the test is
whether the prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer." Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., supra note 3, at 429, 426 P.2d at 176.
Accord, Board of Education v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 293 F. Supp. 541,
544 (D.N.J. 1968); Bollinger v. Nuss, supra note 23, at 337, 449 P.2d at 511;
Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 71, 237 A.2d 857, 862 (1968);
American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. L.C. Jones Trucking Co., 321 P.2d 685, 687
(Okla. 1957); Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., supra note 24, at 47, 298
P.2d at 1023; Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 471, 134 A.2d 223,
228 (1957).
39. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 705.
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claim against the insured exceeds the limits of the applicable policy. However, there is a great divergence among the courts as to what conduct is
prescribed or proscribed by the rule.
Asking what constitutes negligence, bad faith, or lack of good faith is somewhat
like asking what constitutes sin. From Mount Sinai, we have basic prohibitions
against sin, but these have been implemented and changed by reason of man-made
40
laws in various jurisdictions.

The courts have considered various factors in determining whether an
insurer is liable for judgments in excess of policy limits. Some of the
more important ones are: (1) the strength of the injured claimant's
case on the issues of liability and damages; 4 ' (2) the relative financial
risks to which the insured and the insurer are exposed if a settlement offer
is refused;42 (3) the failure of the insurer to investigate and ascertain
facts as to either the liability or damage issues; 43 (4) the failure of the
insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer; 44 (5) the insurer's
rejection of the advice of its own attorney or adjuster; 4 5 (6) the refusal
of the insurer to compromise after a verdict has been entered against its
insured; 46 (7) an attempt by the insurer to induce the insured to contribute to a settlement where the insurer is not willing to contribute its
policy limits; 47 (8) the failure of the insurer to inform the insured of the
possibility of an excess verdict and of his right to engage personal coun40.

Wymore, Safeguarding Against Claims in Excess of Policy Limits, 28 INS.
J. 44 (1961).
41. See Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D.N.J. 1967); Communale
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Radio Taxi Serv.,
Inc., v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 157 A.2d 319 (1960).
42. See Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra note 41; Andrews v. Central Sur.
Ins. Co., 271 F. Supp. 814 (D.S.C. 1967); Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390
COUNSEL

S.W.2d 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
43. See Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra note 41; Davy v. Public Nat. Ins.
Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960); Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat.
Ins. Co., supra note 24.
44. See American Cas. Co. v. Glorfield, 216 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1954); Davy v.
Public Nat. Ins. Co., supra note 43; Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.,

250 La. 105, 194 So. 2d 713 (1967); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White,
supra note 23. See also text infra.
45.

See Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tex. 1968); Kau-

dern v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra note 41; Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., supra note 13.
46. See Hazelrigg v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., supra note 13; United States
Fidelity &Guar. Co. v. Evans, supra note 13.
47.

See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932),

cert. denied 289 U.S. 736 (1932); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Const.
Co., 69 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1934); Springer v. Citizens Cas. Co., 246 F.2d 123 (5th
Cir. 1957). Cf. McChristian v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 748
(W.D. Ark. 1969); Bates v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. N.Y.
1967). See also text infra.
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sel;4 8 (9) an election by the insurer to defend on damages but not on
liability (or vice versa) without the consent of the insured; 49 and (10)
various other specific acts or omissions that have been found to be indicative of bad faith. 50
In the Kiely-Brockstein settlement negotiations, the plaintiff's lawyer
had told the insurer's lawyer that if the policy limits were $50,000
he would settle for $45,000. 51 During the trial, the presiding judge told
the attorney that the case could be settled for $40,000.52 The highest offer ever made by Nationwide was $35,000, 53 though it is not clear
54
whether or not plaintiff was prepared at that time to accept $40,000.
Prior to the trial, when the demand was still $45,000, the highest offer
made was $32,500. 55 The liability question was heavily weighted
against the insureds 5 and the damages, though not specified in the
opinions, included a wrongful death claim where the decedent had a
life expectancy of 16.4 years and an income of $7,000 per year. 7 In
addition, there were eight days of hospitalization, medical expenses,
funeral expenses and pain and suffering prior to the victim's death.5 8
It would certainly seem that Nationwide could have been held liable
under either of two traditional theories: (1) failure of Nationwide to
consider the Brocksteins' interests when it made its decision not to meet
the settlement demand, or (2) failure of Nationwide to keep the Brocksteins informed in the matter of settlement negotiations and to communicate offers received to the Brocksteins. As to the first basis of liability,
48.

Home Indem. Co. v. Williamson, supra note 13.

The American Bar Association, in cooperation with various insurance carriers,
formulated a statement of principles to the effect that insurers will inform insured's of the progress of suits against them and of the probable results. It fur-

ther indicated that the insurer will invite the insured to retain his own counsel if

a conflict of interests arises. The carriers state that this procedure should be
followed in any case where the amount involved will probably exceed policy limits,
where the defense was undertaken under a reservation of rights, or where a counter-

claim appears advantageous to the insured.

Appleman, Circumstances Creating

Excess Liability, 1960 INS. L.J. 533, 591.
49. Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., supra note 43.
50. See generally supra note 21.
51. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 706.
52. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 706.
53. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 706.
54. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 706.
55. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 706.
56. See text infra.
57. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 706.
58. Brockstein 11, supra note 1, at 707.
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New York applies a good faith standard requiring that the insurer give
consideration to the insured's interests when it makes its decision whether
to accept or reject a settlement demand within its policy limits.5 9
For example, in Harris v. Standard Accident and Insurance Co., 60
the court, applying New York law, stated that:
[B]ad faith . . . is most readily inferable when the severity of the plaintiffs injuries is such that any verdict against the insured is likely to be greatly in excess
of the policy limits, and further when the facts in the case indicate that a defendant's verdict on the issue of liability is doubtful. . . . When these two factors coin6
cide and the company still refuses to settle, the inference of bad faith is strong. '

The facts on the issue of liability in Brockstein indicate that "Bloom,
the driver of the truck, had no visibility 'in the center rear.' "62 Although
Bloom stated that he had sounded his horn, the first time he mentioned
it
this fact was in his deposition. He had never previously mentioned 63
Board.
Vehicle
Motor
the
to
or
officer
police
investigating
the
to
either
The issue of liability would on these facts weigh heavily in the plaintiff's
favor. As to the injuries, Circuit Judge Feinberg in his decision in Brockstein II stated that from the injuries "it was obvious-in the words of
Harris and Brown-that a verdict 'greatly in excess of policy limits'
'64
was 'likely,' if liability is assumed."
As to the second theory upon which Nationwide's liability could have
been grounded-the failure of Nationwide to keep the Brocksteins informed in the matter of settlement negotiations and to communicate the
offers it received to the Brocksteins-there is little New York law on
the subject. The only New York Court of Appeals decision touching on
the issue is Streat Coal Co. v. Frankfort General Insurance Co., 65 which
affirmed a dismissal of a complaint alleging the failure of the insurer to
convey an offer of settlement to the insured. The case indicates that
such failure does not constitute bad faith as a matter of law. The
Streat Coal Co. decision was criticized by the United States Court of
59. Young v. American Cas. Co., 416 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1969); Brown v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1963); Harris v. Standard Accident and Ins. Co., 191 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) rev'd on other
grounds, 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843 (1962); Best
Bldg. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., supra note 13; Brunswick Realty Co. v.
Frankfort Ins. Co., 99 Misc. 639, 166 N.Y.S. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 8.
60. Supra note 59.
61. Harris v. Standard Accident and Ins. Co., supra note 59, at 540.
62. Brockstein 11, supra note 1, at 707.
63. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 707.
64. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 707.
65. 237 N.Y. 60, 142 N.E. 352 (1923).
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Appeals in Brown v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,66 which
held that allegations of such failure, along with other enumerated acts or
omissions, presented a prima facie case on the issue of bad faith.
In Brockstein II, Circuit Judge Feinberg stated that such failure "could
itself contribute to an inference of bad faith." 67 While criticizing
the lower court's "unduly restrictive [view] in assessing the inferences
open to [it] under New York law,"68 Judge Feinberg declined "to disturb
Judge Dooling's conclusion that Nationwide did not breach its obligations
to plaintiffs";69 and based his decision to remand upon a holding "that bad
faith may be evidenced by the failure of the insurer even to mention to
the insured his opportunity to make a relatively small contribution to
avoid a large exposure. '70 In reaching this decision the court stated that
at the time of the settlement negotiations, the Brocksteins needed the
judgment of an informed expert to make an objective appraisal of the facts
and law relevant to their case and to give them explicit, expert advice
as to the realistic chances of an adverse verdict above the policy limits,
71
as well as a reasonable estimate of the extent of the excess exposure.
This is a novel and particularly delicate approach. The court thus held
that the insurer could have avoided excess liability by informing the insured: (1) that a demand for settlement had been made; (2) that the
demand was within policy limits; (3) that the insurer had evaluated the
claim at a figure less than the demand and was only willing to pay that
amount; (4) of the realistic chances of an excess verdict and how high such
a verdict might be; and (5) that the insured possessed the right to contribute to the settlement. 72 The court also said that if the insurer "presses
its insured too hard-or even at all-that may be evidence of bad faith."'73
66. Brown v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., supra note 59, at 679-82.
67. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 708.
68. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 707. At n.5 the court stated that Judge
Dooling, in characterizing New York law as "unyielding in declining to recognize
any duty to settle, or to see 'bad faith' in refusals to settle, or other acts that . . .
suggest that the insurer pursued its own interest and left the insured to take care
of his own exposure to uninsured liability," was in conflict with Brown v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., supra note 59.
69. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 707.
70. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 709.
71. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 708.
72. It is interesting to note that the court will apparently only allow a "relatively small contribution." Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 709. The amount involved in the Brockstein case was $7,500 on a demand of $40,000 or nearly
19%. The court does not state whether or not this is to be considered a limit on
the percentage of contribution that insurers are bound to suggest.
73. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 708.
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The insurer is thus put into an almost impossible situation. He is told
that he must fully apprise the insured as to the facts and law of his case
and of the probabilities, in the event of a trial, of an adverse, excess verdict
and of how high such verdict might be. This is all well and good, but the
court now adds that the insurer is not only bound by these good faith
standards, but must also inform the insured that he may, if he desires, contribute toward the within-limits settlement demand. Since the insurer is
required to give full expert advice to the insured,7 4 it would follow that
the insurer must also inform the insured as to the advisability of his making
such a contribution.
This approach may be appropriate in the extreme cases where the
claimant is simply unreasonable in his demand 75 and the chances of a
verdict greatly in excess of policy limits are slight. 76 In such a case the
insurer could proceed as required, with reasonable assurance that in a suit
charging bad faith on the insurer's part in attempting to "induce" the
insured into contributing toward a settlement within policy limits, the insurer would be able to convince a jury that its refusal to meet the demand
was made in good faith and that it had not attempted to "induce" the insured to contribute. But, even in such a case, if a large excess verdict
should be returned, the insurer would be in a difficult situation in attempting to keep the jury judging its motives from being influenced by hindsight. 77 Thus, informing an insured of his right and opportunity to contribute to a settlement within policy limits (or to any settlement above
policy limits if the insurer were not willing to expend such limits)

78

would

seem a very hazardous course for the insurer to follow even in rather obvious cases. 79 As Professor Keeton has said:
Except when the company expresses willingness to pay the maximum sum within the
policy limits, any suggestion to the insured that he contribute toward a settlement
figure, in jurisdictions requiring that the company give equal consideration or more
to the insured's interests, is likely to result in excess liability for the company in
74. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 708.
75. Naturally, the demand here would have to be absolutely outrageous or the
insurer would be faced later with the problem of convincing a jury that the demand
was unreasonable. This would be a very difficult task when a jury has already
found for the injured party in excess of that amount.
76. Once an excess verdict has been returned, it would seem a very difficult

task to prove to a jury that the chances of such an occurrence, when viewed without the benefit of hindsight, were slight.
77. Supra note 5, at 1149-50 n.32.
78. So long as the insurer is only willing to pay a part of its limits, the same
principles would apply whether the settlement demand was above or within policy
limits so long as it was above the amount the insurer was willing to pay.
79.

Supra note 5, at 1149-50 & n.32.
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the event claimant obtains a judgment over the policy limits after a refusal of an
opportunity to settle within them.8 0

The Brockstein II court chose to place this duty upon the insurer to
meet the " 'need for a controlled arms-length discussion between the
assured and the insurer about their respective interests in the settlement.' "81 There would appear to be alternative ways which are better
for meeting this need.
A number of courts hold that the insurer is duty-bound to communicate to the insured offers of settlement received by the insurer. These
rulings are based upon the rationale that since a conflict of interest
exists in such situations, the insured must be notified in order that he can
take whatever course may be necessary to protect his interests if the insurer rejects the offer.8 2

For example, in Roberie v. Southern Farm

Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.,83 the court found the insurer liable for
a $28,000 judgment (on policy limits of $20,000) after making it clear

that it found no fault with the insurer's refusal to settle the case nor with
its defense of the suit. The court said:
The most serious charge against the defendant is the failure of the insurer to keep
the insured informed of any offers of compromise, thus nullifying and negating
84
any possibility of settling the claims to avoid greater loss to the insured.

The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the decision and indicated that
the insurer had a duty to inform the insured of the settlement offer, to advise him of the potential liabilities, and to advise him of the insurer's

declination of the offer. However, it did not indicate that the insurer had
a duty to discuss contribution by the insured. 8
Thus, the Roberie court and others following its line of reasoning consider the need for an "arms-length discussion between the assured and the
insurer about their respective interests in the settlement"8 6 to be met by
the communication of settlement offers received and advice of uninsured
80. Supra note 5, at 1149. See also supra note 47.
81. Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 709.
82. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60 (9th
Cir. 1960); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th
Cir. 1958); Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 419, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204
(1963); Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., supra note 44; State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, supra note 23; Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat. Ins. Co.,
supra note 24; Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 9. See also APPLEMAN, supra note 21.
83. Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 185 So. 2d 619 (La. Ct. App.
1966).
84. Id. at 623.
85. Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., supra note 44.
86. See text supra.
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potential liabilities without the further requirement that the insurer expose
itself to a charge of bad faith by introducing the subject of contribution.
Naturally, this only applies where the insurer is not willing to offer its
maximum limits. 17 Where it is so willing, there is no bad faith chargeable
by the mere advice to the insured that he may settle the claim by contributing the excess amount.""
A strict liability doctrine has been suggested by many writers, and
even some courts, as a solution to the conflict of interests problems.8 9
This doctrine would make the insurer who declines to accept a possible
settlement within policy limits strictly liable for the results of such decision. 0 This theory was rejected in McChristian v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.91 where the court stated:
Quite obviously a reasonable settlement offer involves a proper assessment of the
questions of damages and liability.

Thus, where reasonable cause appears, in the

form of a clearly litigable issue as to damages or liability, for rejecting a settlement
offer and defending the action, the good faith of the company will be vindicated ...
Any other approach would deprive the insurer of practically all discretion and
would result in virtual absolute liability, a wholly unbargained for and unintended
92
consideration.

There is, however, an alternative solution to this problem. This solution recognizes that the stage of "the statistically most important aspect
of defense, the negotiation of settlement, '9 3 is fraught with conflicts of
interests, and that the attorney hired by the insurance carrier to defend
the case for the insured is primarily representing the interests of the insurer and only nominally defending the insured. 94 In those situations
where claims exceed policy limits, insurers could allow the insured to
hire his own attorney, at the insurer's expense, to represent the insured's
interests during settlement negotiations.9 5
87. See text at note 79 supra.
88. Supra note 5, at 1148-49.
89. See note 25 supra.
90. Supra note 3, at 431, 426 P.2d at 177.
91. Supra note 47.
92. Supra note 47, at 753 (emphasis added on "any").
93. Brockstein I, supra note 1,at 227.
94. Supra note 5, at 1168-69.
95. If the insurers refuse to so take the burden upon themselves, legislatures,
courts, or state insurance departments may find a solution for the problem. In
New York, for example, a bill was introduced in 1950 which would have imposed
nearly strict liability on insurers where settlement demands within policy limits are
declined. Dempsey, Excess Liability, 1950 INS. L. 734, 747. Also a bill which
passed the Ohio Senate in 1949, provided that, in order to avoid excess liability,
insurers would need the consent or approval of insureds in rejecting within-limits
settlement offers. Id.
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The present policy is for the insurer to either turn the matter over to
house counsel or to an independent attorney. In any case, only one attorney is retained and he is to represent both the insured and the insurer. 96 The law requires the insurer, in cases of excess-limits claims,
to notify the insured that the claim against him exceeds his policy
limits and that he has a right to hire personal counsel to represent his interests in the resulting conflict of interests situation.9 7 This notice is
customarily given to the insured by letter. 98 If the insured wishes to retain personal counsel, he must do so at his own expense. 99
Since the policy requires the insurer to "defend" the insured and
since the court in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. said "it is common
knowledge that one of the usual methods by which an insured receives
[defense] under a liability insurance policy is by settlement of claims
without litigation," 100 it does not seem an undue extension of present
law to require that the insured be adequately represented by counsel at the
insurer's expense during the negotiation of such settlement. The insurer's
attorney would continue to represent both the insured and the insurer in
trial and all phases of the defense where the interests are not in conflict. 101
Such a solution would not relieve the insurer of its duties under present
law, but it would avoid burdening the insurer with the impossible duty of
discussing contributions as required by Brockstein.
Edward L. Schrenk

LANDLORD AND TENANTIMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITYHOW "CONSTRUCTIVE" IS "EVICTION"?
Plaintiff, a New York businessman, his wife, and their four children
arrived on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, on September 1, 1964. On
September 21, they inspected a furnished Tahitian-style residence of
relatively open structure owned by the defendant. The house was on
96. Supra note 5, at 1168-69.
97. See note 48, and text supra.
98. Supra note 5, at 1169.
99. Supra note 5, at 1169; Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 707 n.6.
100. Supra note 3.
101. If because of special circumstances there were a conflict of interests in
the actual conduct of the trial, two attorneys could be utilized here also. See
supra note 5, at 1170.

